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FAITH IN THE COURT*
By GEORGE R. FARNUM
Former Assistant Attorney General of the United States
"No one can read the history of the Court's career without marveling at its potent effect upon the political development of the Nation, and without concluding that the Nation
owes most of its strength to the determination of the Judges
to maintain the national supremacy."
Warren: The Supreme Court in United States History.

HE Constitution," declared Justice Holmes in one of
his most celebrated dissenting opinions, "is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." It has proved itself,
however, to be a transcendent experiment. Upon its foundation our social, political and economic life were organized and
have been developing toward certain ideals-albeit but dimly
visualized-for approximately a century and a half. The
guardian of its letter and spirit is the Supreme Court of the
United States. Chief Justice Hughes, when Governor of New
York, went so far as to declare: "We are under a constitution,
but the constitution is what the judges say it is." Those of
us who resist any effort to break down its essential integrity
rest our faith in its preservation upon our confidence in the
collective wisdom of the Court and the enlightened statesmanship of its individual members.
The acute exasperation in certain quarters with recent
decisions, notably that nullifying the N. R. A., is no novelty
in American history, though some people have for the moment seemingly forgotten it. In the early decades of its existence, while partisan feelings and political animosities ran
feverishly high, the Court was subjected to such abusive
attack that its usefulness, if not its very existence, was seriously endangered. At intervals since, certain decisions have
provoked recurrent storms of protest.
The Dred Scott case; doubtless an extremely regrettable
pronouncement, was the occasion for the bitterest denunciation. An editorial in the New York Tribune of the time was
l
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characteristic. "The long trumpeted decision * * * having
been held over from last year in order not too flagrantly to
alarm and exasperate the Free States on the eve! of an important presidential election * * * is entitled to just so much
moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those
congregated in any Washington barroom. It is a dictum prescribed by the stump to the bench." The New York Evening
Post, implying that the Court had become the mouthpiece of
a political party for the promulgation of falsehood, declared
that "the moment its decisions cease to be binding, and impeachment, not obedience, belongs to it." "The decision," it
added, "is a deliberate iniquity." Judged now, probably the
worst charge that can fairly be made against the motives of
the Court, as recently put by an eminent authority, is "the
Court yielded by an unfortunate second thought to Justice
Wayne's persuasion that it had in its grasp the opportunity
to settle the constitutional issues arising out of the slavery
question." In the days of Theodore Roosevelt, a project for
the popular recall of judicial decisions was seriously mooted.
As late as 1916 the recrudescence of hostility evoked from
Holmes the following commentary upon its implications:
"The attacks upon the Court are merely an expression of the
unrest that seems to wonder vaguely whether law and order
pay. When the ignorant are taught to doubt, they do not
know what they safely may believe. And it seems to me that
at this time we need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure."
When, however, the fierce political and sectional passions
of the moment ran their course, and the work of the Court
was seen in the sober retrospect, intelligent judgment has
never failed to pronounce the confident verdict that the tribunal performed its duty with unquestionable disinterestedness and, all things considered, wisely and well. Such decisions as the Dred Scott case have been singularly rare and have
been put down to those occasional mistakes from which no
human institution is entirely free.
Through more than a century and a half of extraordinary transformations in our national life, the Court has succeeded in preserving the fundamental character of our constitutional institutions. Looking back dispassionately over the
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difficult path of adjudication, the accomplishment seems little
short of miraculous. It involved the task of applying a general text to conditions never dreamed of by its authors. It
demanded a practical reconciliation, under continually changing social and political conditions, between the Hamiltonian
conception of nationalism (expounded by Chief Justice Marshall) and the Jeffersonian doctrine of state rights (aptly
referred to as the dual-federalism of Madison). It required
the elaboration of a working compromise between traditional
rights of property (or vested interests, as they are termed in
constitutional law) and a recognition of the significance of
human values. It exacted from the Court a reasonable harmonizing of the economic philosophy of laissez faireattended by the phenomenal growth of capitalistic individualism-and the necessity of making a fair concession to our
evolving ideas of a social democratic state. They were largely
pioneer questions of great complexity. In dealing with these
importunate antinomies the Court has seemingly accomplished for the practical ends involved, as Mr. Justice Cardozo
would put it in his flair for posing paradoxes, "The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites."
That there should be some vacillation at times was natural; that views once expressed had in some instances to be
reconsidered in the light of further reflection and the changing
times was unavoidable. It is probably a fact that of no
branch of our jurisprudence can it be more fitly said, than of
constitutional law-in the words of Holmes-that "We do
not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.
No concrete proposition is self-evident, no matter how ready
we may be to accept it."
Furthermore, the character of the medium with which
the Court was dealing must never be lost sight of. As Marshall long ago pointed out, it was a constitution that was
being expounded, and Holmes subsequently added: "But
a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relations of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accidents
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of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States." Dealing with such basic
problems in political philosophy, social science and economic
theory, it was inevitable that the individual members of the
Court should not infrequently differ in their views. Indeed,
this very difference was a healthy indication of vital and independent thinking and proof that the Court was not committed to any one-sided philosophy but was representative of
various ideas that were fairly entitled to their day in court.
In passing judgment, it is also well to bear in mind the
national crises through which the Court has guided us-the
precarious formative period when our American experiment
might have collapsed; the critical period of the Civil War
with its disturbing aftermath of reconstruction; the phenomenal growth of our industrial civilization with its proliferating
problems, and the unprecedented disruption of the World
War followed by bewildering economic breakdown.
In time, those who today hotly impugn the N. R. A.
case-as those who denounced other decisions in the pastwill arrive at a better understanding of its real significance.
After all, it announced no new principle. It simply applied
old fundamental ideas to a radical departure in legislation. It
no more than reminded us again-albeit forcefully and dramatically-that ours is a constitutional democracy. Reading
the two opinions which constituted the unanimous decision
dispassionately, it is difficult to see how the draftsmen of the
act could have believed that it could be squared with American
political ideals and familiar legal theory. Possibly some feelings of grave misgivings explain at least in part the government's reluctance to invite a decisive test and its tardy acceptance of the gage of constitutional battle.
The moral of these few pages is that those of us who are
fairly content with our traditional and established form of
constitutional government-and, while discerning its defects,
can see on the whole no acceptable substitute for it-should
remain steadfast in our confidence in the great Court upon
which in the last analysis its preservation depends. In our
history we find ample support for our faith.

